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THE ROLE OF ASSENT IN ARTICLE 2 AND
ARTICLE 9
MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD*
From its earliest days, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code")
has reflected the tension inherent in a statute that applies to both consumer
and commercial transactions. Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Article
2, and Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter of Article 9, each wrote of the
desirability of different rules for the two transaction types.! Therefore, it
should come as no surprise that the early drafts and final version of Articles 2
and 9 specify different rules for consumer and commercial contracts.
Revision of other UCC Articles in recent years has also reflected the tension
between commercial and consumer transactions. Many observers believe that
these revisions have not struck a satisfactory balance.z The drafting
committees currently revising Articles 2 and 9 have continued the struggle
with this tension. Thus far, however, these drafting committees have done a
better job than the revisers of other Articles of accommodating the needs of
consumer transactions. After briefly reviewing the history of consumer
protection in the UCC and its revisions, this Article analyzes the approaches
of proposed revisions to Articles 2 and 9 with a focus on the assent necessary
for apparent agreement to become binding on consumers in sales and secured
transactions.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Karl Llewellyn repeatedly wrote of the importance of making legal rules
reflect the commercial context in which they are to operate. Default rules, the
gap-filling provisions that apply when the parties to a contract have not
* Walter D. Coles Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. The
author has participated as an Observer in the revision of Articles 2 and 9 and has regularly attended the
meetings of both drafting committees.
1. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transaction Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 44 (1951); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 503-12 (1987).
2. E.g., Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
625, 635 (1993); Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679 (1991); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer,
Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process ofRevising UCC Articles 3 and 4,26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 743, 750-59 (1993); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3
and 4,42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
addressed a particular matter, should reflect the commercial context of
business transactions.3 He wrote of the need for special rules for business
professionals.4 He also wrote of adhesion contracts, which occur in both the
consumer and the commercial context.'
In one of the law's quainter descriptions, Llewellyn wrote:
I know of few "private" law problems which remotely rival the
importance, economic, governmental, or "law"-legal, of the form-pad
agreement; and I know of none which has been either more disturbing
to life or more baffling to lawyers.
... It would be a heart-wanning scene, a triumph of private
attention to what is essentially private self-government in the lesser
transactions of life or in those areas too specialized for the blunt, slow
tools of the legislature-if only all businessmen and all their lawyers
would be reasonable.
But power, like greed, if it does not always corrupt, goes easily to
the head. So that the form-agreements tend either at once or over the
years... into a massive and almost terrifying jug-handled character;
the one party lays his head into the mouth of a lion-either, and
mostly, without reading the fine print, or occasionally in hope and
expectation (not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and gentle
lion.'
This tendency for the terms in a form to become more and more one-sided
certainly is true in the context of consumer transactions. As originally
promulgated, Article 2 did not tackle this issue head on. It did not, however,
leave the issue entirely unaddressed. In thirteen places Article 2 creates
special rules or special standards for merchants,7 which it defines as a person
"who deals in goods of the kind" or otherwise by his occupation or
3. E.g., Karl Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 903-04
(1939).
4. E.g., id.; see also Wiseman, supra note 1, at 503-19.
5. E.g., KARLN. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).
6. Id
7. See U.C.C. §§ 2-103(I)(b) (good faith standard), 2-201(2) (statute of frauds), 2-205 (firm
offers), 2-207(2) (battle of the forms), 2-209(2) (modification and rescission), 2-314 (implied warranty
of merchantability), 2-327(1)(c) (return of goods in sale on approval), 2-402(2) (rights of seller's
creditors), 2403(2) (entrustment), 2-509(3)(risk of loss), 2-603 (rightfully rejected goods), 2-605(l)(b)
(failure to particularize reason for rejection), 2-609(2) (standard for adequate assurance of
performance) (1995).
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employment of a professional agent "holds himself out as having knowledge
or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction."' The
business professional is treated differently from the nonprofessional, and
consumers are among the nonprofessional.9
Section 2-207 is perhaps the most notorious example of the drafters'
recognition of the need for special rules for transactions between merchants.
This section jettisons the common-law mirror-image rule when parties form a
contract through the exchange of standard forms.' ° Interestingly, that section
is not limited to merchants. Because nonmerchants rarely exchange standard
form documents, however, its drafters clearly had business professionals in
mind."
In section 2-207 the Code recognizes that contract formation often does
not adhere to the historic model in which two parties orally negotiate a
transaction and then reduce to writing the exact terms they discussed. Some
contracts, of course, still are formed in exactly this way. I refer to them as
"negotiated contracts." For the most part, however, contracts are formed
either by an exchange of standard forms or by an oral agreement on the major
terms followed by a standard-form confirmation by one or both parties. In its
most innovative step, Article 2 recognizes that neither party reads the
boilerplate in the other party's document and also that neither party expects
the other party to read it. Section 2-207 scraps the common-law mirror-image
rule, under which variations in the forms would prevent the writings from
forming a contract.' 2 Under the common-law rule, a contract would arise only
if the parties proceeded with performance and would be on the terms of
8. Id. § 2-104(l).
9. See also id. § 2-316 cmt. 8 (addressing disclaimers of implied warranties when the buyer has
examined the goods and fails to discover a defect that should have been apparent). The Official
Comment rejects any literal doctrine of caveat emptor and distinguishes between the professional and
nonprofessional buyer. Id The latter, according to the Official Comment, "will be held to have
assumed the risk only for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe." Id
10. See id. § 2-207. It reads:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance... operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different fiom those offered ....
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between
merchants such terms become part of the contract unless ....
Id
11. Section 2-207 also applies to written confirmations of oral agreements. The principal
application of the section, however, seems to be in the context of an exchange of standardized forms.
12. Compare Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915), with Marlene
Indus. Corp. v. Camac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 241 (N.Y. 1978). See generally JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 48 (3d ed. 1990).
1997]
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whichever party fortuitously sent the last form before the parties commenced
performance. 3
Though section 2-207 has proven difficult to apply and has been the
subject of much commentary, 4 it is a positive step in developing the doctrine
of mutual assent. The drafters of Article 2 did not develop a similar new
approach for dealing with adhesion contracts in the context of consumer
transactions. This does not mean, however, that they completely neglected the
problems posed by adhesion contracts. Though not literally confined to
contracts of adhesion, several provisions operate primarily in that context.
These include the provision on unconscionability 15 and the provision on
disclaimers of implied warranties. 6 Neither of these sections establishes a
special rule for adhesion contracts or for consumer transactions, but both
apply with special force to contracts of adhesion in the consumer context. By
imposing a conspicuousness requirement for the effectiveness of disclaimer
language, section 2-316 attempts to ensure that buyers are actually aware of
the seller's limitations concerning the quality of the subject matter of the
transaction. Further, the unconscionability section provides a safety valve to
ensure the most basic sense of fairness in a contractual exchange in which a
merchant uses a standard form that contains harsh boilerplate, the contents of
which are unknown to the consumer.
Similarly, Article 9 expressly recognizes that the differences between
commercial and consumer transactions call for different rules. Consumer
transactions attracted much attention in the process of drafting original Article
9.17 Several provisions of the Article relate solely to consumer transactions,
13. See MURRAY, supra note 12, § 49, at 160-62.
14. See John E. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1307, 1309 n.5 (1986) (citing articles).
15. U.C.C. § 2-302(l) (1995). It reads:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id
16. Id § 2-316. It provides in part:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in the case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a
writing and conspicuous.
Id
17. According to the principal drafter of Article 9, "how much or how little Article 9 should do
for the consumer, or about the special problems arising in the consumer field, has caused more debate
[VOL. 75:289
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including a section that limits security interests in after-acquired property 8
and a section that provides minimum statutory damages for the failure of a
secured party to comply with certain statutory duties. 9
Article 9 also contains some limited recognition of problems related to
assent. Section 9-501 prohibits any attempt to waive certain duties,2" and it
validates a waiver of other duties only if the waiver is written and occurs after
the debtor defaults.2' For the most part, these restrictions are not confined to
consumer transactions.22 Nevertheless, they implicitly recognize that a
consumer is unlikely to recognize and understand the risks involved when he
or she is required at the time of contract formation to assent to a waiver of
statutory protections.
This brief description of the drafting history and the originally enacted
versions of Articles 2 and 9 reveals that consumer protection has been a part
of the UCC since its inception. Subsequent revisions of the Code have
continued to struggle with the dichotomy between negotiated commercial
transactions and adhesion consumer contracts. In 1987, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the
American Law Institute ("ALl") approved new Article 2A, which expanded
the scope of the Code to include the lease of goods. Though the impetus for
this effort came from persons concerned with commercial leases, Article 2A
also applies to consumer leases. Indeed, it contains several provisions that
than any other single matter that has been considered in the course of drafting." Gilmore, supra note 1,
at 44.
18. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1995) (limiting a security interest in after-acquired property to property
that the consumer acquires within ten days after the secured party gives value).
19. Id § 9-507(l) (minimum damages in the amount of the finance charge plus either 10% of the
cash price of the goods or 10% of the principal of a loan). There are other provisions applicable only to
consumer transactions. Id. §§ 9-307(2) (giving priority to consumers who purchase from other
consumers goods that are subject to a security interest), 9-505(1) (prohibiting strict foreclosure when a
consumer has paid 60% of the cash price or loan principal).
Early drafts of Article 9 contained provisions addressing several other aspects of consumer
transactions: disclosure of credit terms, layaway plans, and abolition of the holder-in-due-course
doctrine. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 45-47; Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 323.
20. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1995) (referring to sections 9-502(2), 9-504(2), and 9-507(1)).
21. Id, § 9-501(3) (1995) (referring to sections 9-504(3), 9-505(1)&(2), and 9-506). The first
three of the referrants contain the phrase, "if [the debtdr] has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right," and the last contains the phrase, "unless otherwise agreed in
writing after default."
22. E.g., id. § 9-501(3) (speaking in general terms). But see id. § 9-505(1) (applying only to
certain consumer transactions).
1997]
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apply only to consumer leases.' The failure to include more provisions,
however, delayed enactment in some states.24
In 1985 NCCUSL and ALI undertook revision of Articles 3, 4, and 8,
dealing with commercial paper and the banking and securities systems. The
initial effort produced the New Payments Code ("NPC").25 The NPC
expanded the scope of Article 3 well beyond the checks, notes, and drafts that
lay at the core of original Article 3. The NPC reconceptualized the entire field
of payment instruments, included important consumer protection provisions,
and met with overwhelming resistance.26 A more modest revision of Articles
3 and 4 then occurred, with very little attention to consumer transactions in
the final product.2 This lack of attention was controversial and led to
significant opposition to enactment on the part of consumer groups in some
states, ultimately producing a lack of uniformity in the enacted versions in
those states.28
Largely because of the experience with enactment of revised Articles 3
and 4, NCCUSL sought a consumer presence at the drafting table to revise
Articles 2 and 9.29 Though no official representative of any consumer group is
23. Id §§ 2A-106 (choice of law and forum), 2A-108(2) (unconscionable conduct to induce
formation of a contract or to enforce a claim), 2A-108(4) (unconscionability and award of attorney's
fees), 2A-109(2) (burden of proof for good faith), 2A-221 (casualty), 2A-309(5)(a) (rights to goods
that become fixtures), 2A-406(1)(b) (excused performance), 2A-407 (independence of promises), 2A-
504(3)(b) (liquidated damages), 2A-516(3)(b) (notification of litigation for infringement). See
generally Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Arlicle 2A, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 957 (1988).
24. For example, West Virginia did not enact Article 2A until 1996 and then only with
substantial modifications to address consumer transactions. 1996 W. Va. Acts ch. 160. California also
modified Article 2A before enacting it. See, e.g., lB U.L.A. 671-72 (1989 & Supp. 1996).
25. UNIFORMNEWPAYMENTS CODE (P.E.B. DraftNo. 9, 1983).
26. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 746.
27. Id.
28. For example, New York and Massachusetts have yet to enact them and 17 states modified
section 4-406 before enacting it. 2B U.L.A. 398, 401-03, supp. 77 (1991 & Supp. 1996); see also
Rubin, supra note 2, at 783-84 (citing California, Colorado, Michigan, Washington, and West
Virginia). For systematic treatment of Articles 3 and 4, see Hillebrand, supra note 2.
29. A precursor of NCCUSL's recognition of the need to have the consumer voice at the drafting
table was a program instituted by the Consumer Financial Services Committee of the American Bar
Association's Business Law Section. This Committee is concerned with state and federal laws
affecting the consumer credit industry. Until 1989, its membership consisted almost entirely of persons
whose practice entailed representation of the interests of credit-granting institutions. Several members
of this Committee were active in the revision of Articles 3 and 4. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 751-52,
776-79 (discussing the roles of Roland Brandel and David Goldstein, active members of the ABA
Committee). Partially in response to the adverse reception given Articles 3 and 4, the ABA Committee
sought to achieve a broader perspective at its meetings. To this end, in 1989 the Committee instituted a
Consumer Fellows program, awarding fellowships to five persons representing consumer interests. The
[VOL. 75:289
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a member of either drafting committee," consumer representatives have been
formally and informally invited to participate as Observers.3' This
participation has taken the form of written and oral comments as the Drafting
Committee considers the need for revision of the various provisions of Article
2. By contrast, in the Article 9 project, the Drafting Committee deferred
consideration of consumer transactions until its general revision was
complete. Initial involvement by consumer representatives consisted
primarily of participation on a task force on consumer issues. This task force,
which was composed of representatives of consumer interests and
representatives of credit-granting institutions,32 met for two years, but could
not reach consensus on most issues. Simultaneously, in the Article 2 revision,
some of the Drafting Committee's preliminary decisions on consumer issues
proved to be controversial. Consequently, NCCUSL's Executive Committee
directed each drafting committee to establish a subcommittee to recommend
resolution of the issues affecting consumer transactions that had arisen in the
course of the work of the drafting committee. As this Article is being written,
the subcommittees have reported to their respective drafting committees, the
drafting committees have largely adopted the recommendations of the
fellowships provided for reimbursement of travel expenses and encouraged the fellows to become
actively involved in the programming and leadership of the Committee. The first group of fellows
were Mark Budnitz (of Georgia State University School of Law), Kathleen Keest (then of the National
Consumer Law Center), Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le (of Notre Dame University School of Law), Michelle
Meier (of Consumers Union), and the author.
For a fuller discussion of the participants in the drafting process, see Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform
Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 69 (1997).
30. Nor was any consumer representative on either of the study committees that preceded
appointment of the drafting committees. The closest was the presence on the Article 9 Study
Committee of David Lander, who once headed Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, but who has since
1988 represented financial institutions as a partner at St. Louis's Thompson Coburn (then known as
Thompson & Mitchell).
31. On the Article 2 project, these representatives include Gail K. Hillebrand (of Consumers
Union) and Yvonne W. Rosmarin (formerly of the National Consumer Law Center). On the Article 9
project, they include Hillebrand, Rosmarin, Michael A. Ferry (of Legal Services of Eastern Missouri),
David B. McMahon (formerly of West Virginia Legal Services Plan), and Norman Silber (of Hofstra
University School of Law and chair of the Consumer Protection Committee of the New York City Bar
Association). In addition, several academics with a special interest in consumer transactions have
participated in each project.
32. Representatives of creditors included Edward J. Heiser Jr. (representing the American
Financial Services Association, an organization of consumer finance companies and others in the
consumer credit business), William B. Solomon and Thomas Buitewaite (both of General Motors),
Tracy L. Hackman (of Chrysler Financial Corp.), Mary Price (of Bank of America, representing the
California Bankers Association), and James M. Swartz (of Primus Automotive Services).
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subcommittees, and NCCUSL's Executive Committee likewise has largely
approved the positions taken by the drafting committees. The remainder of
this Article compares and contrasts the different approaches of proposed
Article 2 and proposed Article 9 with respect to the subject of assent in
consumer transactions.
II. ARTICLE 9
One of the overarching objectives of the revision effort is the expansion of
Article 9's scope by extending the rules of Article 9 to additional types of
collateral. The premise is that the rules in Article 9 for creating and perfecting
consensual liens are clearer and more efficient than the common-law rules
applicable to types of property not currently within the scope of Article 933-
e.g., payment intangibles, nonpossessory agricultural liens, insurance policies,
and tort claims. The goal is to clarify and simplify the rules for acquiring and
perfecting security interests in these types of assets. In addition, there has
been a push to extend Article 9 to deposit accounts. Article 9 already reaches
deposit accounts to the extent they consist of proceeds of other collateral;
proponents of this proposal want the scope of Article 9 to include deposit
accounts as original collateral, too. As with virtually every other proposal
either in the Study Committee report or initially generated by the reporters,
the rationale for the proposal is anchored in commercial transactions. When
extended to consumer transactions, any expansion of the scope of Article 9
necessitates inquiry into the reality of assent in those transactions.
The draft of Article 9 retains, without substantive change, the freedom of
contract position of section 9-201."4 This means that Article 9 poses no
limitations on the types of goods in which a creditor may take a security
interest and pays no special attention to the process by which a consumer
apparently assents to the creation of a security interest in his or her assets. A
consumer who seeks a loan to finance the purchase of a tangible, such as a car
33. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 44-45, 56-59 & app. J at 552-57, 582-86
(1992) [hereinafter PEB ART. 9 STUDY GROUP REPORT].
34. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, Secured Transactions; Sales of
Accounts and Chattel Paper § 9-201 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Oct. 1996)
[hereinafter Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9], available at <http:llwww.law.upenn.edu/llbmry/ulclulc.htm>
(visited on Jan. 10, 1997). Proposed section 9-201 reads: "(a) Except as otherwise provided by this
Act, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral, and against creditors."
[VOL. 75:289
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or a house, typically knows that the tangible will serve as collateral for the
loan. The consumer who simply seeks a loan for intangibles, such as medical
treatment, education, or a vacation, however, may not think about the need
for collateral. The creditor may not call the matter to the consumer's
attention. Instead, the creditor may simply use standard form documents that
include a provision by which the consumer agrees to convey a security
interest in generally specified assets, e.g., electronic entertainment equipment
and art objects.35
There is much force to the proposition that a person-even a consumer-
should be able to use any of his or her assets to secure an extension of credit.
Much can be said for making it easy and inexpensive to create security
interests that creditors can perfect and enforce with the confidence that they
will not be vulnerable to attack by third parties. On the other hand, several
considerations counsel caution. One is a concern that consumers may become
overextended, taking on more debt than they can afford to repay. One hopes
that creditor vigilance precludes this, because it is not in a creditor's interest
to extend credit beyond a consumer's ability to repay. Perhaps if the world of
credit were confined to secured credit the system would operate this way. The
availability of unsecured credit, including bank credit cards, however,
forecloses this control against overextension. Further, even in the world of
secured credit, the system does not operate to prevent overextension of credit.
Every creditor knows that some of its customers will default, and the price of
credit reflects these defaults. Even so, denying credit to every potential
customer whom the creditor can accurately predict will default is a gain to the
creditor. Unfortunately, the costs of identifying these customers increases at
the margin. So long as the finance charge is set at a level that compensates the
creditor for the risk of this loss, the incentives to vigilance are
counterbalanced by the costs of exercising vigilance.
35. A Federal Trade Commission regulation makes it an unfair or deceptive practice for a
creditor to take a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in household goods, which are
defined to be
[c]lothing, furniture, appliances, one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware,
and personal effects (including wedding rings) of the consumer and his or her dependents, provided
that the following are not included within the scope of the term "household goods": (1) Works of
art; (2) Electronic entertainment equipment (except one television and one radio); (3) Items
acquired as antiques; and (4) Jewelry (except wedding rings).
16 C.F.R. § 444.1(1) (1996). As a result of this limitation, small loan companies now often take
security interests in household goods that fall outside the federal definition. See KATHLEEN E. KEEST,
THE COST OF CREDIT, REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 8.5.4.4 (1995); JONATHAN SHELDON,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 5.1.3.6, at 176 (3d ed. 1991).
1997]
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The question then arises whether there are some assets that should be
protected against an improvident pledge. Perhaps deposit accounts merit
special protection against the temptation to pledge assets that are necessary
for daily sustenance.36 This protection seems analogous to exemption statutes,
which seek to preserve against the claims of judgment creditors a minimum
level of assets for an impecunious consumer. 7 The analogy fails, however,
because typically those laws permit the debtor to give a security interest, even
a nonpurchase money security interest, in exempt assets. 8 This suggests that
there may be nothing sufficiently special about deposit accounts to warrant a
ban on their use as collateral.
39
The critical need is ensuring that the consumer truly assents to the pledge
of an asset that is essential for daily sustenance. The risk is twofold. One risk
is that consumers will not realize that they are conferring a security interest in
the deposit account because the grant appears in the fine print boilerplate. The
other risk is that creditors will include deposit accounts in the boilerplate
simply to gain access to another asset in the event of default, as opposed to
making credit available because of ex ante reliance on the deposit account as
an asset. After all, unless the account is put beyond the reach of the consumer,
the creditor cannot count on its existence or size some months or years later.40
Indeed, the possibility of withdrawal of funds from the account led the
drafters to propose that, even in commercial transactions, the only way to
perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral is by
taking control of the account.4' The likeliest context for security interests in
36. Deposit accounts include checking accounts and savings accounts, both of which might be
the repository of a consumer's paycheck or social welfare benefit.
37. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.020 (West 1987); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a)
(McKinney 1978), WASH. REV. CODE § 6.15.010 (1995). See generally William T. Vukowich,
Debtors'Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779 (1974).
38. See also, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 6.15.050(4) (1995). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4401 (West 1980) (prohibiting security interests in exempt personalty); see also Brooklyn Loan
Corp. v. Gross, 18 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. 1940) (public policy prohibits waiver of exemption).
39. It is noteworthy that we are not really talking about a ban on deposit accounts as collateral.
The question is whether they should be brought within the scope of Article 9. Even if the answer is
negative, it may still be possible for a creditor to obtain a security interest in a deposit account, albeit
through the more cumbersome and less reliable non-UCC procedures for obtaining and enforcing
consensual liens. See PEB ART. 9 STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, app. G at 330-33.
40. On the other hand, although the creditor may not be able to rely on the availability of any
given deposit account, the creditor may be able to determine that over its entire base of defaulting
customers it will be able to realize a predictable amount from deposit-account collateral. This could
have the effect of lowering its loss from defaulting customers and lowering the price of credit for all
customers of the creditor.
41. See Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 34, §§ 9-109 (defining control), 9-310(a)(2) (control
[VCOL. 75:289
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consumer deposit accounts is in connection with extensions of credit by the
depositary itself, in which context the draft stipulates that the secured party
has control.42 The depositary, of course, already has a right of setoff.43
Therefore, the existence of an Article 9 security interest may not add much
security for the creditor.
Another way in which the draft permits a creditor to gain control of an
account is to obtain an agreement by the depositary that it will comply with
the creditor's instructions concerning disposition of account funds. To the
extent that control may occur by the depositary's consent, the risk of
inadvertent creation of a security interest through apparent assent to
boilerplate continues. This could occur, for example, if the creditor forwards
to the consumer's bank a copy of its loan contract with the consumer,
conferring a security interest in the creditor, and the bank returns a form
agreeing to comply with the creditor's instructions. The consumer might
never be aware that he or she conferred the security interest on the creditor.4
To deal with this risk, creation of the security interest should depend on
compliance with special requirements designed to ensure that the consumer is
aware that the deposit account is at risk. Indeed, the risk of inadvertently
placing this asset at risk is so great that there is a strong case for the
proposition that the creation of a security interest should require the
immediate loss of access to the account. As it happens, however, the Drafting
Committee agreed with the consumer representatives and abandoned the
proposal with respect to consumer deposit accounts. The difficulties of
ensuring true assent to placing this often critical asset at risk fully justify this
is the only means for perfecting a security interest in deposit accounts), 9-312 (perfection by control).
Notably, taking possession of a certificate evidencing the existence of the account is not within the
definition of taking control.
42. Id § 9-109(a). It provides:
A secured party has control over a deposit account if-
(1) the secured party is the depositary institution with which the deposit account is
maintained;
(2) the depositary institution with which the deposit account is maintained agrees in
writing that, without further consent by the debtor, the depositary institution will comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the account; or
(3) the secured party becomes the depositary institution's customer (Section 4-104) with
respect to the deposit account.
Id.
43. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-7, at 745-
46 (4th ed. 1995).
44. The likelihood of this scenario is substantially diminished by virtue of the fact that the
depositary bank thereby jeopardizes its common law right of setoff.
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apparently paternalistic decision.
Although proposed Article 9 does not do much to ensure assent to the
substantive terms of a secured transaction, it is sensitive to problems of assent
in connection with the procedures on default. This sensitivity is a carryover
from current Article 9. The current version of section 9-501 provides that
"[t]o the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the
secured party, the rules stated in [seven subsections] ... may not be waived or
varied... ."'4 The proposed revision almost trebles the number of subsections
that cannot be waived or varied, but this is largely the result of breaking the
current subsections down into more numerous subsections.46 The proposal
retains the current statute's concept that a debtor's waiver of a statutory right
at the time of formation of the contract is highly suspect. Especially in the
consumer context, the typical debtor will not be focusing on the likelihood or
consequences of default and, in any event, will not be aware of the debtor's
statutory rights. Coupled with the inevitable location of any such waiver, viz.,
in the small-print boilerplate, assent to a waiver is a fiction. Hence, both the
current and the proposed Article 9 deny effectiveness to contractual waivers
of statutory protections. On the other hand, some statutory protections may be
waived after default, at a time when the debtor more properly may be
expected to focus on the matter. For example, current section 9-504(3)
permits post-default waiver of the consumer's right to notification of the
disposition of collateral.47 The proposed revision retains this idea.4" The risk
remains, however, that a consumer who surrenders collateral to a secured
party will be asked at the time of surrender to sign several papers and will do
so without realizing that this apparent assent operates to waive some of these
statutory rights. The draft therefore provides that a waiver "is ineffective ...
unless the secured party establishes by clear and affirmative evidence that the
debtor ... expressly agreed to its terms."'49 This subsection appears in the
draft in brackets, indicating that the Drafting Committee has not yet formally
45. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1995).
46. For example, current subsection 9-504(3), which specifies the rules for notification and
disposition of collateral after default, is transformed into five sections, each with subsections, several
of which add new requirements for the secured party to meet. See Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, surpa note
34, §§ 9-610(b), 9-611, 9-612, 9-613, 9-614.
47. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995); see also id. § 9-501(3) (exception to the nonwaiver rule for the
secured party's obligation to dispose of the collateral in the manner specified in sections 9-504 and 9-
505).
48. Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 34, § 9-623.
49. Id § 9-623(c).
[VCOL. 75:289
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/8
THE ROLE OF ASSENT
approved the idea.
The draft also retains the waiver rules of current section 9-505, permitting
the debtor to consent to the secured party's retention of the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt" This consent must be given only by a post-default
writing,5 but the draft does not impose the higher burden of establishing
express agreement by clear and affirmative evidence. Instead, it simply settles
for a writing signed after default. The lack of any deficiency liability may be
thought to justify this if the creditor accepts the collateral in full satisfaction
of the debt. The flaw in this reasoning is the fact that the consumer is waiving
any right to a surplus if the value of the collateral exceeds the debt. The
creditor's incentive to offer taking the collateral in full satisfaction is, of
course, highest in just this situation. Consequently, the higher burden of proof
should apply here, too.
In another revision of this section, the Drafting Committee responded to
the special needs of consumer transactions. Current section 9-505(2) permits
the secured party, with the debtor's post-default consent, to keep the collateral
in full satisfaction of the indebtedness.5 2 The Drafting Committee decided to
modify this to authorize the secured party, with the debtor's consent, to keep
the collateral in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness. Recognizing the high
risk of ineffective communication in the consumer context, the Committee
limited this authorization to commercial transactions; therefore, retention of
collateral in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness is not a possibility in
consumer transactions. 3
These provisions relating to post-default assent reflect the reality of assent
in the context of consumer secured transactions far better than the predecessor
provisions in current Article 9. Current Article 9 makes waivers ineffective if
they are boilerplate in the original security agreement, but it implicitly accepts
the traditional rule of viewing a post-default signature on a document as
assent to everything within the document,54 regardless of whether the signing
party has any actual knowledge of the contents of the document. To a modest
50. Compare U.C.C. § 9-505 (1995) with Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 34, § 9-618(b).
51. Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 34, § 9-618.
52. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1995).
53. Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 34, § 9-618(g) ("In a consumer secured transaction, a
secured party may accept collateral only in full satisfaction, and not in partial satisfaction, of the debt it
secures.").
54. Eog., U.C.C. § 9-505(1) & (2) (1995) (imposing obligations on the secured party if the debtor
"has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights").
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extent, the proposed revision attempts to ensure true assent to the post-default
proposals of the secured party.
III. ARTICLE 2
Current Article 2 contains several provisions that recognize that parties to
a transaction do not always read the written matter documenting the
transaction. Foremost among these are sections 2-207 and 2-316. Because the
focus of this Article is consumer transactions, I will not discuss the former,
which rarely is implicated in the consumer context. On the other hand, the
latter section is implicated in almost every purchase of high or moderately
priced goods.
Section 2-316 is not confined to consumer transactions, and it exemplifies
the pro-buyer orientation of Article 2's default rules. It seeks to enhance the
likelihood that, even if the buyer has not read the entire document embodying
the transaction, the buyer will be aware of a disclaimer of implied warranties.
To be effective, subsection (2) requires a disclaimer of the implied warranties
of merchantability or fitness to be conspicuous." To be sure, subsection (3) of
section 2-316 apparently permits a nonconspicuous disclaimer to be
effective.5 6 The Official Comment, however, drives home the point, "This
55. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1995). The section provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous,
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous.
Id (emphasis added). "Conspicuous" is defined by the Code as
so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals... is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color.... Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for
decision by the court
Id § 1-201(10).
56. Id § 2-316(3). It reads:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty ....
Id The courts disagree on the question whether the conspicuousness requirement of subsection (2) also
applies to subsection (3). See Julian McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 812-16 (1978). Compare Gindy
Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp. 268 A.2d 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970) with Gilliam v. Indiana
Nat'l Bank, 337 So. 2d 352 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976).
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section ... seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by ... permitting the exclusion of implied warranties
only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer
from surprise.'5 7 There could not be a clearer recognition that many contracts
are formed or governed by documents that one or both parties are unlikely to
read.
Whether section 2-316 is effective to ensure that the consumer consents to
the absence of warranties is, of course, an entirely different matter. For
example, the statute requires the seller to use the word "merchantable,"
presumably for the purpose of ensuring that the buyer knows what is being
disclaimed. Unfortunately, consumers do not understand that the term means
"fit for ordinary purpose."58 Instead, consumers apparently believe the term
means "saleable."59 An express disclaimer of merchantability therefore does
not effectively communicate that the goods need not be fit for their ordinary
purpose. Further, whether or not the consumer understands the legal meaning.
of the term "merchantability," section 2-316 makes the complying disclaimer
effective even if the consumer has not actually seen it.
The other main provision in current Article 2 that attempts to assure that
the contract tracks the actual assent of the parties is section 2-202. Section 2-
202 embodies the Code's version of the parol evidence rule.' This section,
too, is not confined to consumer transactions. Rather, it applies to all
transactions and liberalizes the "four comers" rule, under which the court
looks only to the written contract document to determine if it is a complete
integration of the parties' agreement.6' Under section 2-202 noncontradictory
agreements supplement the written agreement unless the court affirmatively
concludes that the parties intended the writing to be the exclusive statement of
the terms of the deal. According to the Official Comments, the court should
reach this conclusion only "[i]f the additional terms are such that, if agreed
upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view of
the court."62 Section 2-202 thus places greater emphasis on ascertaining the
actual agreement of the parties than on the formality of the document. This
57. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (1995).
58. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
59. For example, surveys of law students in my Consumer Transactions course at two law
schools revealed that even after being exposed to 1!6-2 2 years of legal studies, 40% did not accurately
understand its meaning.
60. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
61. See MURRAY, supra note 12, at 385-86.
62. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1995).
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focus is especially appropriate in the consumer context where the document is
prepared entirely on behalf of a corporate entity that wants to insulate itself
from the promises and assurances of its sales people.
Section 2-302 also addresses the assent process by authorizing the court to
deny enforcement of unconscionable contracts or contract terms.63 Though
not mentioning assent, section 2-302 permits courts to police contracts in
which a consumer's assent has been procured by coercion,' manipulation,65
or deception.66
Proposed Article 2 goes further. The new approach is most evident in the
sections dealing with warranty disclaimers and adhesion contracts. In
commercial transactions a disclaimer of warranties is effective if it is
conspicuous and uses appropriate language.67 This is little changed from the
63. Id. § 2-302(1). Section 2-302(1) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id
64. See, e.g, Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(commercial transaction); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (door-to-door sale).
65. See, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
66. See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (referral sales
scam and English-language document used in a transaction negotiated in Spanish with consumers who
could not read English).
67. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2 Sales § 2-407(c) (Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Jan. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2], available at
<http:llwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclulc.htm> (visited on Feb. 20, 1997). Proposed section 2-407
reads:
(b) Except in a consumer contract, if language in an agreement is construed to disclaim or modify
an implied warranty, the following rules apply:
(1) All implied warranties are disclaimed or modified by language [or expressions] that under
the circumstances call the buyer's attention to the disclaime[r] or modification of the warranties and
states that the implied warranties have been disclaimed or modified.
(2) Subject to Section 2-206(a), conspicuous language contained in a record that disclaims or
modifies an implied warranty is sufficient to satisfy paragraph (1) in the following cases:
(A) A disclaimer or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability is sufficient if the
language mentions merchantability or states "These good may not be fit for their ordinary purpose'
or is of similar import.
(B) A disclaimer or modification of the implied warranty of fitness is sufficient if the language
states "There are no warranties that these goods will conform to the purposes for which they are
purchased made known to the seller" or is of similar import.
(C) Language like "as is" or "with all faults" is sufficient to disclaim or modify an implied
warranty.
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current law.'s In consumer transactions, however, a disclaimer is effective
only if the consumer expressly agrees to it: "[Lianguage in a consumer
contract purporting to disclaim or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose is
ineffective unless the buyer has expressly agreed to it."69
This provision represents an attempt to single out a critically important
term and ensure that the consumer realizes that it is part of the deal. In most
transactions the disclaimer will not be negotiable, and the requirement of
express agreement is really a method of disclosure. In practice, it is likely to
translate into a separate signature. The effectiveness of this section to make
consumers aware that the seller does not stand behind the quality of the goods
may depend on the number of separate signatures that are required, in
addition to the signature used to obligate the consumer to pay. For many
kinds of goods, this will be the only one; for others, however, this will be one
of several additional signatures. For example, in connection with the purchase
of a used car on credit, a consumer may be asked to sign or initial a credit
application,7" an odometer disclosure statement,7' an acknowledgment of
receipt of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement,72 a credit life insurance
disclosure,73 a credit disability insurance disclosure,74 a gap insurance
disclosure,7" a service contract, an affirmation that the consumer has and will
maintain casualty insurance, and a promissory note. In this context, one may
question whether a separate signature on a disclaimer-of-warranties clause
will effectively communicate that the disclaimer is part of the deal. Further,
(3) If the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods, sample, or model as
fully as desired or has declined to examine them, there is no implied warranty with regard to
conditions that an examination in the circumstances would have revealed.
(4) An implied warranty may be disclaimed or modified by course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade.
Id § 2-407(b) (first set of brackets in original).
68. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1995). For the full text of section 2-316(2), see supra note 54.
69. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 67, § 4-407.
70. Incredibly the signing of the credit application often does not occur until the final closing.
71. See 49 U.S.C. § 32705 (1994).
72. This is not required by law but is frequently used by creditors to insulate them against a later
claim that they failed to provide the required disclosures.
73. Truth-in-Lending Act § 106(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1994); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(d)(1) (1996).
74. Truth-in-Lending Act § 106(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1994); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(d)(1) (1996).
75. See Truth-in-Lending Act § 106(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1994); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R §
226.4(d)(2) (1996).
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one can expect consumers' attorneys to argue that, notwithstanding the
separate signature, the consumer did not expressly agree to it. If the consumer
can persuade the court that the seller did not provide a realistic opportunity to
read all the documentation, but instead presented a stack of papers with a
series of signature lines and said, "Sign here and here and here... ," the
disclaimer should be ineffective. I am skeptical, however, whether many
courts will agree.
An alternative approach to dealing with warranties, at least for new goods,
is to render disclaimers of implied warranties ineffective. This is the approach
taken, as a practical matter, by the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 6
Section 108 provides that if a supplier" of goods makes a "written
warranty,"7" it may not disclaim implied warranties.79 The primary articulated
rationale for this ban is the deception present when a manufacturer makes an
express warranty that goods are free of defects and simultaneously disclaims
the implied warranty that the goods are fit for their ordinary purposes.80
Another rationale, albeit not anchored in any lack of assent, is that a person
dealing in goods should stand behind them, at least to the extent of warranting
that they are fit for their ordinary purposes." This rationale explains the laws
of the several states that invalidate disclaimers of warranties in the sale of
consumer products.82
76. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 (1994).
77. Under Magnuson-Moss, "[tihe term 'Supplier' means any person engaged in the business of
making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers." Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act § 101(4), 15 U.S.C. 2301(4) (1994).
78. Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, [t]he t rm "Written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of
a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or
workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will
meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer
product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in
the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which
written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.
Id § 101(6), 15 U.S.C. 2301(6) (1994).
79. Id. § 108(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a), (c) (1994).
80. This section is designed to eliminate the practice of giving an express warranty while at the
same time disclaiming implied warranties. This practice often has the effect of limiting the rights of the
consumer rather than expanding them as the consumer might otherwise be led to believe. H.R. REP.
No. 93-1107 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,7722.
81. See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal
Warranty Regulation As a Consumer Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 97-100 (1978).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1792.4 (West 1985); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1
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In most states, of course, current state law permits sellers to disclaim the
implied warranty of merchantability.83 Not all merchants, however, actually
disclaim it. For example, many retailers use only sales receipts or other
simple forms to document their transactions with consumers. The implied
warranty of merchantability arises and is not disclaimed. On the other hand,
retailers who use more elaborate written contracts typically include
disclaimers in those documents. If the retailer does not make a Magnuson-
Moss "written warranty"--and most do not-then the federal prohibition of
disclaimers does not apply.84 Unless a state statute prohibits disclaimer of
implied warranties-and only a handful do-the retailer is free to disclaim
them. A ban would accrue to the consumer when the manufacturer is out of
business, when the manufacturer cannot or will not repair or replace the
goods, and when the consumer finds it to be more convenient to deal with the
retailer than with the remote manufacturer. Invalidation of disclaimers in
connection with the sale of new goods has both an assent- and a nonassent-
based rationale.
An assent-based case is also possible for invalidating disclaimers in
transactions for the sale of used goods. The proposition that a person should
be able to bargain for any lawful exchange is unassailable. The unassailability
of the proposition depends, however, on the existence of sufficient knowledge
on the part of the parties. Even if consumers are aware of the existence of a
disclaimer-a doubtful proposition under current law-it is questionable
whether consumers truly understand the meaning and significance of a
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability. A twenty-year old
study by the Federal Trade Commission found that between twenty and forty
percent of consumers did not understand that "as is" means that they bore all
risk of quality in the goods they purchased.85 Instead, many thought the
expression applied to superficial or cosmetic defects rather than functional
defects.8 6 Perhaps the twenty years' experience under the Commission's Used
Motor Vehicle Rule87 has educated consumers about the meaning of "as is."88
(1992); see also Donald F. Clifford, Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers
and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
83. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1995).
84. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1994).
85. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, SALE OF USED MOTOR
VEHICLES 262-65 (1978) (recommending adoption of what ultimately became the Used Motor
Vehicles Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 455 (1996)).
86. Id. at 264-65.
87. 16 C.F.R. pt. 455 (1996).
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Interestingly, proposed Article 2 takes the position-soundly in my
opinion-that "as is" and "with all faults" are per se effective only in
commercial transactions.89 In consumer transactions there must be express
agreement.
90
Another section establishing different rules for assent in consumer and
commercial transactions deals with contract modification. It is common for a
contract to provide that any modification of it must be by a signed writing.
Courts applying the common law generally have been hostile to no-oral-
modification clauses.9' Current Article 2 seeks to validate them, but it
recognizes that different rules are appropriate: if the no-oral-modification
clause appears on a clause presented by a merchant, it must be separately
signed by the consumer.92 The requirement of a separate signature is designed
to enhance the likelihood that the nonmerchant is aware of the need to get any
modifications in writing. As previously discussed,93 the effectiveness of this
approach depends in part on the number of separate signatures that are
required. In addition, one may question whether a consumer is likely to
remember this type of information at the time of a subsequent modification.
Therefore, instead of requiring a separate signature, the proposed revision
simply exempts consumer contracts from the rule that validates no-oral-
modification clauses.94
This pro-consumer change actually may, in some instances, harm
consumers. The change will help the parties when they have, in fact, orally
modified their contract Contrariwise, it will cause harm to one of them when
the other falsely asserts an oral modification. Whether these adverse effects
fall more on consumers or merchants depends on which of them more
88. lam skeptical, but an empirical study would be useful.
89. Jan. 1997 Draft Art. 2, supra note 67, § 2-407(b)(2)(C). For text of subsection, see supra
note 67.
90. Id. § 2-407(c).
91. See, e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.);
Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 136 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1957) (Musmanno, J.).
92. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995). The UCC provides:
A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing
cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on
a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
93. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
94. Jan. 1997 Draf Art. 2, supra note 67, § 2-210(c). It provides: "(e]xcept in a consumer
contract .... an agreement that contains a term prohibiting modification or rescission except by a
signed record may not be otherwise modified or rescinded." The section, like the current Code, retreats
somewhat from this by incorporating principles of estoppel and waiver. See id. § 2-210(b),(c); see also
U.C.C. § 2-209(4), (5) (1995).
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frequently has the accurate version of the facts. Although the change
promises to effectuate the intent of the parties as it evolves over the life of the
contract, perhaps here no special rule for consumer transactions is necessary.
Even for nonconsumer transactions, the proposed revision states,
However, a party whose language or conduct is inconsistent with a
term requiring a signed record to modify or rescind the contract may
not assert the term if the language or conduct induced the other party to
change its position reasonably and in good faith.95
This provision, which protects reliance on an oral modification, may better
balance the need for enforcing actual modifications with the risk of false
allegations of modification.
Ease of judicial administration is a major justification for a number of
common-law contract rules. One example, to be discussed below, is the rule
that a person is bound by what he or she signs, whether or not he or she has
read and understood it. It is trite to state that the formation of a contract
requires the assent of the parties. Because of the difficulty of verifying the
actual, subjective assent of one whose actions manifest assent, the courts have
long applied a predominantly objective approach to determining whether the
parties have assented to an exchange.96 When the manifestation takes the
form of a signature, the bound-by-what-you-sign rule avoids an inquiry into
the subjective.97
Another doctrine that seems designed primarily for ease of administration
is the parol evidence rule. Under this doctrine prior or contemporaneous oral
agreements are rendered unenforceable when the parties adopt a writing as
the exclusive embodiment of the exchange.9" The premise for the rule is that
the parties have agreed that a written document embodies the entire deal.
When the premise is true, the rule is unassailable. The difficulty, of course, is
determining whether the premise is true: did the parties intend the writing as
the exclusive embodiment of the exchange? Judicial attitudes have differed
significantly, from giving conclusive effect to an integration clause,99 to
95. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 67, § 2-210(c); see also id. § 2-210(d) (recognizing waiver
of a no-oral-modification clause).
96. See. e.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F.2d 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd 201 F.
664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (Holmes, J.); see also Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566
P.2d 505 (Or. 1977).
97. For a critique of this position, see MURRAY, supra note 12, § 97.
98. See id. §§ 83-84.
99. See, e.g., Tapper Chevrolet Co. v. Hansen, 510 P.2d 1091 (Idaho 1973).
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
conclusively inferring an integrated agreement from a complete-on-its-face
writing,' 0 to considering all proffered evidence of the parties' intent.'
Merchants who draft form contracts prefer the more restrictive applications
because those applications allow the merchant, at the time of drafting, to
control the terms of the transaction. This places on the consumer the risk that
sales personnel will make unauthorized agreements. That risk should be on
the merchant because the merchant is the entity that employs and trains the
sales staff.'0 2 The countervailing risk is that the consumer will lie about the
negotiations and the salesperson's promises. The parol evidence rule in
current Article 2, as elaborated by the Official Comments, liberalized the
prevailing pre-UCC interpretation of the common law rule.'0 3 The proposed
revision retains the main rule of the current statute, but it adds the following
subsection to address the question of whether the parties intended the writing
to be the exclusive embodiment of the exchange:
(b) In determining whether the parties intended a record to be final or
complete and exclusive with respect to some or all of the terms, the
following rules apply:
100. See, e.g., Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924).
101. See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
102. Of course, one may argue that consumers should read before they sign and should get
everything in writing. This is a grand ideal, but it ignores the reality of contract formation in the age of
the standard form. Merchants do not expect consumers to read the documents and often put roadblocks
in the path of consumers who would like to read them. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
103. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995). It provides:
Terms . . . which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Id. Official Comment 3 adds:
Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved unless
the court finds that the writing was intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement
of all the terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been
included in the document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be
kept from the trier of fact.
Id. cmt 3.
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(1) The court shall consider all evidence relevant to the intention of the
parties to integrate the record, including evidence of a previous
agreement or representation or of a contemporaneous oral agreement
or representation.
(2) Except in a consumer contract, a contractual term indicating that
the record completely embodies the agreement of the parties is
presumed to state the intention of the parties on the issue."
At the meetings of the Drafting Committee, representatives of businesses
that enter negotiated transactions expressed a very strong need to have some
way of ensuring that the writing that results from extensive negotiations is
insulated from any attack that the writing does not represent the entire
contract. Hence, subsection (b)(2) creates a presumption that an integration
clause is effective. In standard form contracts, especially in the consumer
context, however, the presumption is not appropriate: a party who does not
read the document and is not expected to read the document does not even
know that the integration clause is in the document. Nevertheless, many
courts have failed to get the message of current section 2-202 and the
Restatement section 214 to look beyond the four comers of the document to
determine the parties' intent with respect to complete integration. 05 Because
the effectiveness of the parol evidence rule depends on the intent of the
parties to embody the entire contract in a single writing, the proposed revision
of section 2-202 deprives boilerplate language in a standard form consumer
contract of any presumptive effect that the intent exists. This is not as strong
as an earlier proposal that declared that an integration clause should have no
effect in a consumer contract."° The Drafting Committee rejected this
proposal at its meeting in October 1993.'07 The rejected proposal directly
recognizes that an integration clause in a consumer contract will almost never
104. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 67, § 2-202.
105. See, e.g., Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 215 S.E.2d 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Noble v.
Logan-Dees Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 290 So. 2d 14 (Miss. 1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 214 (1979). The Restatement provides: "Agreements and negotiations prior to or
contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish (a) that the
writing is or is not an integrated agreement; [and] (b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is
completely or partially integrated .... Id
106. See Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales § 2-202(b) (Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with author).
107. See Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199_) § 2-202 (Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, (1996)), available at <http://www.law.upenn.eduflibraryl
ulc/ulc.htm> (visited on Jan. 10, 1997).
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be a product of the intention of the consumer. Unfortunately, by merely
denying an integration clause presumptive effectiveness, the current proposal
stops short of this position.
The primary innovation with respect to assent appears in section 2-206.
This section has been something of a moving target because the Drafting
Committee has struggled with the question of how to deal with assent in the
context of standard forms. Until recently, the draft of section 2-206
encompassed commercial as well as consumer transactions."°8 At the
November 1996 meeting, however, the Drafting Committee voted to confine
the section to consumer transactions. Under the January 1997 draft, section 2-
206 establishes the baseline rule that a consumer is not bound by a term in a
standard form document if the reasonable consumer could not have expected
it in the form.'09 In the context of commercial transactions in which the parties
exchange standard forms, section 2-207 has long recognized that the parties
do not read the form of the other and do not expect each other to read the
forms. It adopted new rules of mutual assent for this set of commercial
transactions."0 Proposed section 2-206 recognizes that in consumer
transactions typically the merchant neither expects nor desires the consumer
to read the contract document. It places a limit on the common-law rules,
under which a party is bound by what he or she signs. Unconscionability is a
safety valve that guards against outrageous terms; proposed section 2-206
establishes a more appropriate standard against which to measure whether
108. Under the November 1, 1996 draft, section 2-206 stated:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) and Section 2-207(a), if all or part of an agreement is contained in
a standard form and the party that did not prepare the form manifests assent to it, that party adopts
all the terms contained in the form as part of the contract except those terms that are
unconscionable.
(b) Where a consumer has manifested assent to a standard form, a term contained in the form
which the consumer could not have reasonably expected is not part of the contract unless the
consumer expressly agrees to it
(c) A term adopted under subsection (a) becomes part of the contract without regard to the
knowledge or understanding of individual terms by the party assenting to the standard form,
whether or not the party read the form.
(d) A term of a standard form which is unenforceable under other provisions of this article,
such as a provision that requires conspicuous language or express agreement to a term, does not
become part of the contract unless those other provisions are satisfied.
Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Sales § 2-206 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Laws, Nov. 1, 1996), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulclulc.htm> (visited on
Apr. 17, 1997).
109. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 67, § 2-206(a).
110. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995) (quoted in relevant part in supra note 10).
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terms in a standard form document are part of the contract.
The UCC actually laid the basis for this position a long time ago. Section
1-201(3) defines "agreement" as a "bargain of the parties in fact.""'  This
definition invites attention to the actual intent of the parties regarding assent
to any particular matter. Proposed section 2-206, in effect, accepts this
invitation and implements it to reflect the nature of contracting in consumer
transactions.
The question remains whether the section establishes the right rule. At one
extreme is the view that if the consumer is not aware that the provision is in
the document, the consumer does not assent to it. This view amounts to a
complete rejection of the objective theories of mutual assent. As a means of
arriving at the intent of the parties when they have not considered various
contractual matters, this view might be perfectly appropriate. Of course, it
would undermine altogether the usefulness of standard form contracting."'
A less extreme view focuses on presumed expectations rather than actual
intent. Even if a person has not thought about the terms of a contract, it is
possible to identify consumers' reasonable expectations about those terms.
For example, the fine print should not eviscerate the negotiated terms" 3 and
should not circumscribe the remedies for breach to such an extent that the
seller's undertaking is almost illusory."4 Examples of terms ordinarily
beyond presumed expectations are total disclaimers of quality standards and
clauses specifying a distant forum for any litigation." '
111. Id. § 1-201(3). It provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as
provided in this Act (Sections 1-205, 2-208, and 2A-207). Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of
contracts (Section 1-103). (Compare "Contract" [in Section 1-201(11)].)
Id. Subsection (11) defines "contract" as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." Id § 1-201(11).
112. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1175 (1983).
113. LLEWELLYN, supra note 5, at 370.
114. See U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1995). It provides that
it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If
the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal
consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties
outlined in the contract.
Id.
115. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976) (distant forum abuse); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69,77,90-93 (N.J. 1960) (warranty).
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Under an approach focusing on presumed expectations, it is necessary to
determine whether to key on the presumed expectations of the party to the
contract, the presumed expectations of a reasonable person in the position of
that party, or the presumed expectations of reasonable persons who form
contracts with that merchant. This again presents the question of how
subjective or objective the test should be. A purely subjective approach may
be too much of ajolt to the jurisprudence of the last century. Proposed section
2-206 is an innovation, and a cautious approach is warranted. I would favor
an objective standard that focuses on the customer base that the merchant
serves and seeks to serve. This would neglect the presumed expectations of
some customers of the merchant while protecting the expectations of the
mass. It is likely that adoption of proposed section 2-206 will increase the
number of disputes concerning the enforceability of terms in standard form
documents. An objective standard should alleviate phenomenon, which is
likely to be short run, in any event. Over time, the courts will establish the
content of the "reasonable expectations" standard. In the meantime,
merchants can minimize their litigation risk by not drafting close to the edge.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the process of revising Articles 2 and 9, the Drafting Committees have
followed different paths. The Article 2 Drafting Committee has considered
consumer and commercial transactions simultaneously. That is, the
Committee's discussion of a given section of Article 2 has encompassed its
applicability and impact on both commercial and consumer transactions. The
Committee has strived to ensure that its proposed revision of a section
accommodates both kinds of transactions. Sometimes it has done this by
creating exceptions or adopting special provisions for one or the other. This
contrasts with the approach of the Article 9 Drafting Committee, which
deferred consideration of consumer transactions until virtually completing its
initial consideration of commercial transactions. Only then did the Committee
consider adding specially crafted rules, or exceptions to commercial rules, for
consumer transactions. This different approach, in my opinion, reflects
different familiarity with, and sensitivity to, the needs of consumer
transactions on the part of the two Drafting Committees and their reporters.
When all is said and done, however, both Drafting Committees have
incorporated provisions to enhance the likelihood that there is genuine assent
by consumers.
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